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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
-vs 
VICKIE LYNN SHUPE 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 14136 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction on a charge of distribution of a 
controlled substance for value in violation of §58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii), Utah Code 
Annotated, (1953) as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted of distribution of a controlled substance for 
value in the Third District Court of Utah, the Honorable Judge Ernest F. 
Baldwin, Jr. , presiding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction on grounds that she was 
acting as the agent of an undercover narcotics agent employed by the police to 
buy narcotics and thus, cannot be convicted for the crime of distribution. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts except for one point are undisputed. On the morning of 
I 
July 16, 1974, Appellant was approached by one Carolyn McPhee in the area 
of 2nd South and 5th West. Both Appellant and McPhee testified that they knew 
each other previous to this occasion. Appellant testified that McPhee approached | 
her and asked where some heroin might be obtained. McPhee testified that 
Appellant asked if she (McPhee) had come to buy something. The trial judge 
did not distinguish the legal effect, if any, this initial conversation has upon 
the case. 
In any event, Appellant was occupied with an acquaintance when initially 
• • • • • ' • • , • i 
approached by McPhee. Thereafter, Appellant informed McPhee, whom she 
had known as a narcotics user, where some narcotics might be obtained. Appellant 
and McPhee entered the Baywood Hotel and proceeded to a room occupied by 
someone known only as Pat. McPhee handed two five dollar bills to Appellant 
who in turn handed the money to Pat. Pat handed a balloon of heroin to Appellant 
who in turn handed it to McPhee. The appellant received no payment or profit from the 
transaction. McPhee left the Baywood Hotel in the company of Appellant. Shortly 
thereafter, Appellant was arrested for the unlawful sale of a controlled substance. 
She was found guilty of aiding and abetting in the commission of a crime. She 
appeals from that conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLANT WAS ACTING AS AN AGENT FOR THE 
UNDERCOVER AGENT AND THUS CANNOT BE CONVICTED 
FOR AIDING AND ABETTING THE COMMISSION OF A SALE. 
I 
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In State v. Shultz, 21 Ut. 2d 391 (1972) Justice Henroid in his dissent 
set forth the defense of agency which was adopted by this Court in the second 
Shultz case, State v. Shultz, 28 Ut. 2d 240 (1973). In the second Shultz case, 
this Court adopted the line of decisions and reasoning as set forth in Smith v. 
State, 396 S. W. 2d 876: 
We think that the New York case and the Durham cases are 
correct and reject the view that one who acts only as an 
agent, servant, or employee of a law enforcement officer 
in the purchase of narcotic drugs for evidence purposes, 
and who is in no way connected or associated with the 
seller and receives no financial profit from the single sale, 
can be guilty of selling the narcotic drugs when the law 
enforcement officer is not. (Cited at 27 Ut. 2d 396) 
In Shultz two, the Court through Justice Tuckett, in adopting the agency 
defense said: 
The defendant having been charged with the selling of a narcotic 
drug rather than being in possession of the same raises an issue 
under the facts of this case as to whether or not the defendant 
was an agent of the enforcement officer. The facts would support 
the proposition that defendant was induced by the enforcement 
officer to procure the controlled substance as the sole agent of 
the officer, and that the defendant had had no prior association 
with the seller nor was he acting in concert with the seller in 
the transaction. The record would also support the proposition 
that the defendant did not profit from the transaction. At 241. 
Although this case was tried to the Court alone, it is Defendant's 
position that Judge Baldwin was of the same erroneous belief as was the trial 
judge mentioned by Justice Henroid in Shultz one, that being 
. . . that the refusal [to give an agency instruction] was based 
on the Court's belief that anyone is a principal in a completed 
sale, irrespective of whom he is helping, so long as he is 
not the buyer himself. This principal, if adopted, would make 
every undercover agent who makes a planned purchase of heroin 
_o 
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for an officer, a seller to the policeman who employed and 
made him an agent to buy from X, the real seller. At 395. 
The trial judge after hearing the evidence made the following findings: 
1. ..-. the Court finds specifically that the only reason that 
undercover [agent] was on the street was to induce somebody 
to commit a crime by selling her heroin. That's an absolute-
that is my finding of fact on that, I cannot be talked out of 
that. [p. 61] 
2. I cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was --
1 just don't have any evidence before me that she [the defendant] 
was the agent of the sel ler . . . [p. 59] 
2 (a). The State's own evidence was that the ten dollars was 
the going price for a shot. [p. 58] 
3. I don't believe under the evidence that this defendant is 
guilty of making a sale for profit unless she is an aider or 
abettor, [p. 61] 
4. I would have to believe this defendant is guilty of aiding and 
abetting the sale by encouraging, soliciting in the same sense 
that she took her to the woman who had it. [p. 67] 
And when asked by defense counsel what the Court's finding as far 
as agency, the Court replied: 
I don't even know what they mean by the word as the Supreme 
Court uses agency, it is a very loose word. [p. 62] 
:
 It seems clear that the trial court did not understand that an agent by 
definition is going to aid and abet the commission of a crime. In this case, 
the defendant admitted taking the undercover girl to a person who would sell 
her heroin. Shultz also admitted actions which would have made him an 
aider or abettor if he wasn't an agent of the undercover agent who was an 
agent of the police officer. 
The court in this case found that the undercover girl was there to 
induce the commission of a crime, that the defendant was not the agent of the 
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seller, that the defendant did not make a profit. In addition, there was no 
evidence of any prior association between the seller (Pat) and the defendant. 
With the above in mind, the Court found her guilty of aiding and abetting the 
sale, " . . . by encouraging, soliciting in the sense that she took her to the woman 
who had it. " The defendant would submit that because the Court felt she aided 
or abetted the sale, the Court felt that the defense of agency was unavailable. 
Accordingly, she asks that the case be reversed and she be granted a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHEN R. MC CAUGHEY 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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